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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A. The District Court erred in denying DNA testing
Sarah made the required showing under I.C. § 19-4902 to obtain DNA testing.
1. There is new technology available to test evidence
Idaho Code § 19-4902(b) states that a petitioner may, at any time, file a petition for the
performance of DNA testing on evidence “which was not subject to the testing that is now
requested because the technology for the testing was not available at the time of trial.” Here, the
district court found that the “advanced DNA amplification, purification, and analysis techniques”
described in Dr. Hampikian’s affidavits (DNA R p. 219-220) were technology not available at
the time of trial. DNA R p. 243. Sarah does not challenge that finding. This new technology
could be used to test samples which were too small to be DNA tested at the time of trial or which
came back with inconclusive results. What Sarah does challenge is the court’s finding that “[t]he
existence of new DNA profiles with which to compare samples tested prior to trial by DNA
technology existing at the time” is not new technology under I.C. § 19-4902(b). DNA R p. 243.
There were many DNA profiles obtained at the time of trial which could not be matched to any
person. However, since the time of the trial the CODIS database had been greatly expanded and
now includes, for example, the DNA of Christopher Hill, whose fingerprints were found all over
the murder weapon.
The state argues that neither the improved DNA analysis techniques nor the expanded
CODIS database are new technology. That argument is incorrect. First, the state’s reliance on
McGiboney v. State, 160 Idaho 232, 370 P.3d 747 (Ct. App. 2016), review denied (2016), is
misplaced. There, the “district court determined that the DNA expert’s ‘affidavit failed to make
1

an unqualified statement that the DNA testing now sought by the Petitioner was not available at
the time of his trial,’” in 2008. Id., at 160 Idaho at 236, 370 P.3d at 751. (Sarah’s trial was in
2005.) Here, Dr. Hampikian’s affidavit states that “Post amplification cleanup with Montage
columns and Low Copy (LCN) DNA analysis are new technology which allows DNA testing on
much smaller samples than was available at the time of Sarah Johnson’s trial in 2005” DNA R
p. 218-219 (emphasis added). He also stated that a “new more sensitive Globalfiler DNA
amplification kit” was not available until 2012. Id. He also made the unqualified statement that
the “new technology will permit DNA testing to be done on samples that could not have been
tested at the time of the trial.” Id. (emphasis added). In particular, Dr. Hampkian listed fifteen
samples which ”could not have been tested at the time of the trial, but may now be tested.” DNA
R p. 219-220. So, in that respect, this case is easily distinguishable from McGiboney.
The state then goes on to quote a passage of dicta from McGiboney: “Technology is not
unavailable at trial merely because technology is now ‘dramatically better.’” Brief of
Respondent (“State’s Brief”) p. 12, quoting McGiboney, 160 Idaho at 236, 370 P.3d at 751. The
apparent thrust of the state’s argument is that qualitative improvements in DNA analysis should
not be considered new technology if a more primitive form of DNA analysis could have been
performed at the time of trial. The Court should not adopt the McGiboney dicta because it is
logically unsound. Improvements upon an existing technology are new technology, especially
when the improvements make the old technology “dramatically better.” For example, Galileo’s
telescope was available in the 1600's, but it did not have the power of the Hubble Space
telescope, even though both are visible light optical telescopes. Advancements in the same basic
technology have made the Hubble telescope dramatically better than Galileo’s telescope. Those
2

improvements resulted in new technology. As the district court found, “New technology need
not be radically different, as the State seems to be asserting. A stagecoach and an SUV are the
same technology (i.e., four wheeled transportation devices), but to say that the latter is not newer
technology than the former would be untenable.” DNA R p. 242. But that question is mostly of
theoretical interest in this case because fifteen of the samples listed in Dr. Hampikian’s affidavit
were not able to be DNA tested the trial of trial. There was no DNA technology for those
samples at the time of trial, while there is now.
As to whether the expanded DNA database in CODIS is new technology, the state argues
that the statute “provides for DNA ‘testing’ not DNA comparisons to the state database.” State’s
Brief, p. 13. But the results of DNA testing have no value unless they are compared to known
samples of DNA. As Sarah has noted, the plain meaning of the word “technology” is “a manner
of accomplishing a task especially using . . . knowledge.”1 While some of the samples could be
compared to the CODIS database at the time of trial, many of those samples did not return with a
“hit.” Those samples should be ordered retested against the vastly larger database which exists
today. According to the National Institute of Justice, “[a]t the end of 2004, CODIS contained
just over 2 million offender profiles.”2 While, according to the FBI, “[t]he National DNA Index
System (NDIS) contains more than 12,348,009 offender profiles, 2,361,870 arrestee profiles, and
708,416 forensic profiles as of May 2016.”3 The CODIS knowledge base has increased more
than seven-fold since the time of Sarah’s trial. This is new “technology” under the plain meaning

1

www.merrium-webster.com/dictionary/technology.

2

www.nij.gov/journals/266/pages/backlogs-codis.aspx

3

www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics
3

of the word.
Further, CODIS technology is used to “test” DNA. A “test” is “a critical examination,
observation, or evaluation.”4 Thus, the state’s argument that the DNA statute “provides for DNA
‘testing,’ not DNA comparisons” (State’s Brief, p. 13) misses the point. Comparison of the DNA
results to known samples is an aspect of the testing process.
To the extent the words “technology” or “testing” are deemed to be ambiguous, this Court
should read those words broadly in order to give effect to the intent of the legislature, since the
statute is remedial in nature. “It is a well-known canon of statutory construction that remedial
legislation is to be liberally construed to give effect to the intent of the legislature.” Hill v. Am.
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 150 Idaho 619, 625–26, 249 P.3d 812, 818–19 (2011), quoting, State v.
Hobby Horse Ranch Tractor & Equip. Co., 129 Idaho 565, 567, 929 P.2d 741, 743 (1996).
Allowing the DNA samples, most of which were collected at the time of the murders in 2003, to
be compared to the samples in the much larger 2016 CODIS database would further the purpose
of the legislation, i.e., “to allow for post-conviction DNA testing in appropriate cases” and to
give “Idaho inmates [a] statutory right to tests that may exonerate them.” Statement of Purpose,
2001 Idaho Laws Ch. 317 (H.B. 242). Thus, both as a matter of its plain language and in order to
effectuate the purpose of the statute, this Court should find the 2016 CODIS database is
“technology [that] was not available at the time of trial” and find that the CODIS comparison
process to be “testing” as that word is used therein.
2. Identity was an issue in the trial.
The state also observes that “[t]he statute provides no guidance on what [the identity]
4

www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/test
4

requirement means and the state is unaware of any existing authority interpreting this language.”
State’s Brief, p. 11. Sarah is also unaware of any Idaho case law interpreting the identity
requirement, nor could she find any legislative history. But again, the plain, usual and ordinary
meaning of the word “identity” is not difficult to discern. “Identity,” used in this context, means
“the condition of being the same with something described or asserted.” An example of its use
is, “They arrested the wrong man. It was a case of mistaken identity.”5 The state asserted at trial
that Sarah was the principal or an accomplice to the murder. She denied killing her parents or
assisting another in doing so. Thus, identity of the murderer(s) was the issue at trial. As found
by the district court:
At trial, the State asserted that Johnson was the individual that murdered her
parents. . . . The defense argued that Johnson was not the murderer, pointing the
finger at an unknown third party. The jury, based on the evidence before it, was
asked to decide whether Johnson was indeed the murderer (either directly, or by
aiding and abetting the shooter). Therefore, because the identity of the murderer
was at issue in Johnson's trial, the requirements of I.C. § 19- 4902(c) have been
met.
DNA R p. 244.
Perhaps there is no Idaho case law addressing the state’s question because the meaning of
the statute admits of only one interpretation, i.e., that identity is at issue at the trial if the
defendant does not concede that he was the one who committed the act constituting the crime.
Identity would not be an issue only when the defendant admitted committing the act, such as
when a defendant accused of murder admits killing the victim but claims self-defense or when a
defendant accused of rape admits to sexual intercourse but argues it was consensual.
According to Justin Brooks & Alexander Simpson, Blood Sugar Sex Magik: A Review of
5

www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/identity (emphasis in original).
5

Postconviction DNA Testing Statutes and Legislative Recommendations, 59 Drake L. Rev. 799,
822-23 (2011), twenty-one state post-conviction DNA statutes and the federal statute limit DNA
testing to cases where the identity of the perpetrator was at issue at trial. Another six states
require that identity was or “should have been” an issue at trial. Id, at 821-822. The California
legislative history of its DNA statute explains the meaning of the identity requirement.
[T]he only persons who could request DNA testing under this bill are those who
had cases in which “identity” was the key issue. Thus, these are cases where a
person was identified by a victim or witness as the person who had committed the
crime and no defense such as self-defense or consent was used. This will limit the
number of cases that this bill will apply to.
Id, quoting discussion from the California Senate Committee meeting on April 11, 2000,
regarding California Penal Code Section 1405.
The out-of-state cases also support Sarah’s common-sense interpretation of the statute.
The Missouri Supreme Court wrote as follows:
The phrase “identity at issue” encompasses “mistaken identity,” but it also
includes all cases in which the defendant claims that he did not commit the acts
alleged-as opposed to cases where the defendant admits his actions but puts forth
an affirmative defense. See Weeks [v. State], 140 S.W.3d [39] at 47 n. 8 [Mo.
2004).
Other states have similarly held. See Anderson v. State, 831 A.2d 858, 865
(Del.2003) (“Identity is always an issue in a criminal trial unless the defendant
admits having engaged in the alleged conduct and relies on a defense such as
consent or justification.”); State v. Donovan, 853 A.2d 772, 776 (Me. 2004)
(“[I]dentity may be at issue during a trial even when the alleged victim identifies
only the defendant as the perpetrator of a crime but the defendant claims no crime
was committed.”); People v. Urioste, 316 Ill. App.3d 307, 249 Ill. Dec. 512, 736
N.E.2d 706, 714 (2000) (“Where a defendant contests guilt based upon
self-defense, compulsion, entrapment, necessity, or a plea of insanity, identity
ceases to be the issue.”).
State v. Ruff, 256 S.W.3d 55, 57 (Mo. 2008). Similarly, the Montana Supreme Court states that

6

“[a] petitioner may satisfy this requirement by showing that identity was a legitimate contested
issue at trial. This is the case when a defendant denies having committed the acts alleged.”
Haffey v. State, 233 P.3d 315, 318 (Mt. 2010). Accord, State v. Peterson, 836 A.2d 821 (N.J.
App. Div. 2003) (Identity was issue in the case for purposes of post-conviction DNA statute
where defendant’s only defense at trial was that he was not the perpetrator, even though the
state’s evidence that he was the perpetrator was strong.).
The state appears to argue that identity might not have been an issue in the criminal case
because there was “undisputed evidence that the defendant was present at the scene of the crime
and there is evidence, including DNA evidence6, that the defendant committed the crime[.]”
State’s Brief, p. 13. But mere presence at a crime scene does not foreclose a defense of identity.
A bank employee accused of taking money out of the safe can defend the case by admitting her
presence in the bank but denying she was the one who pocketed the money, even when her DNA
is found along with DNA samples from an unknown contributor on the handle of the safe. The
identity of the person who contributed the other DNA found on that handle could show the bank
employee is innocent, if that unknown person is someone who would not have authorized access
to the bank.
It is odd that the state now questions whether identity was an issue at trial because it
argued the opposite to the jury. The prosecutor said in closing argument:
Now what kind of defense did the defense put up? It’s called a SODDI defense.
6

The state is apparently referring to the presence of Sarah’s DNA inside of a latex glove.
This is hardly evidence of Sarah’s guilt since the latex glove came from a family first aid kit and
could have been used by Sarah prior to the morning of the murders. In addition, there was DNA
from an unknown person also found in the glove. It is unlikely that both Sarah and the unknown
contributor wore the glove on the morning of the killings.
7

S-O-D-D-I. And you know, that’s a defense that’s well-worn, that the defense
resorts to when the facts are against them and the law is against them.
Now, what is it? It’s Some Other Dude Did It.
Supplemental Trial Transcript (“Supp. Tr.”) p. 177, ln. 3-10. In rebuttal the state again hit on
this theme:
The defense has tried to convince you that there is a reasonable doubt in this case
due to the possibility of an unknown shooter.
Supp. Tr. p. 315, ln. 24 - p. 316, ln. 8.
The defense at Sarah’s trial was “No blood, no guilt,” i.e., that the absence of any
biological evidence on Sarah showed she was not the one who killed her parents. She also
argued that she was not an accomplice to the murders. She did not admit killing her parents nor
did she argue that it was justified or excused. Thus, identity was an issue at trial.
3. The evidence to be tested has been subject to a sufficient chain of custody.
The state did not dispute below that the evidence Sarah asks to be tested is subject to a
reliable chain of custody. DNA R p. 242.
4. The testing method requested would likely produce admissible results.
The state did not dispute below that the testing methods requested were likely to produce
admissible results.
5. The result of the testing has the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative
evidence that would show that it is more probable than not that the petitioner is innocent.
The district court found that due to the weight of the evidence at trial the new DNA
methods did not have the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that would
show more probably than not that Sarah is innocent. The state reiterates the court’s summary of

8

that evidence. State’s Brief, pp. 15 - 18. It ignores, however, Sarah’s argument that she need not
show the test results prove her innocence until after the tests are completed. To obtain testing, all
she needs to show is that the new testing methods have the “scientific potential” to produce
exonerating evidence. Opening Brief, pp. 17-19. Likewise, the state does not address the
arguments made by amicus curiae, the Idaho Innocence Project, that “Idaho law requires only that
such testing on its own and without regard to trial evidence has the scientific potential to
produce new, noncumulative evidence that it is more probable than not that the petitioner is
innocent.” Brief of Amicus Curiae, p. 11 (emphasis in original); see pp. 8-11 (for supporting
argument).
Sarah has already demonstrated how the district court has greatly overstated the strength
of the state’s case. Opening Brief, pp. 19-32. That argument need not be repeated here.
The state does make some new arguments about the strength of the evidence. First, it
notes that “most of the 30 stain samples taken from the robe matched Diane and others were
consistent with Johnson’s profile and Diane and Alan could not be excluded as contributors.”
State’s Brief, p. 19. But, it is no surprise that Sarah’s bathrobe has Sarah’s DNA on it anymore
than it would be surprising if the robes of the members of this Court have the individual Justice’s
DNA on them.7 And it is to be expected that Alan and Diane’s DNA would be on the robe as a
result of the shootings. What is unexpected is the presence of DNA from someone who is not
Sarah, Diane, Alan, or even Bruno Santos, just as it would be surprising if the Justice’s robes had
the DNA from a complete stranger on them. The fact that there were three different unknown
7

The DNA expert was careful to point out that Sarah’s DNA in the stains was not
necessarily from her blood, but could have been from skin cells, urine, tears, saliva or other
bodily fluids. T Tran. p. 3440, ln. 4 - 3341, ln.1.
9

contributors (Trial R p. 3463, ln. 16-22) only goes to show that there is more than just one
potential alternative suspect.
Of course, all this demonstrates why the statute was drafted to avoid this type of
discussion. It is impossible to determine in advance what the effect of the new DNA evidence
will be. Only once we know what the new evidence shows can we determine whether, “in light of
all admissible evidence, that the petitioner is not the person who committed the offense,” as
required by subsection (f) of the statute. Until then, it is sufficient that the evidence have the
“scientific potential” to produce exonerating evidence. The trial court erred by jumping to the
subsection (f) inquiry prior to permitting testing under subsection (e).
B. This Court should overrule Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014), and
remand claims 2-5.
1. Sarah did not invite dismissal of her claims by acknowledging controlling precedent
Sarah did not invite the dismissal of her claims. What she did was acknowledge new,
controlling precedent from this Court. She wrote:
Claims Two-Five could have been raised in the original post-conviction petition,
but were not due to the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, and thus
could have been raised in this successive petition pursuant to Palmer [v. Dermitt,
102 Idaho 591, 635 P.2d 955 (1981)]. However, Murphy [v. State, 156 Idaho 389,
327 P.d 365 (2014)] now appears to present a bar to their presentation.
Accordingly, Sarah will file a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus raising the
ineffective assistance of counsel claims as now permitted by Martinez v. Ryan,U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012) and Trevino v. Thaler,- U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 1911
(2013).
R 209. She then noted that, prior to Murphy, Martinez v. Ryan did not apply in Idaho because
Palmer provided an adequate and independent state procedure to raise post-conviction claims
which had been defaulted due to the deficient performance of post-conviction counsel. She then

10

observed that “[n]ow that Palmer has been overruled by Murphy, Martinez permits Sarah to raise
the ineffective assistance of counsel claims in this petition directly in federal court and bypass the
state courts entirely.” That is a correct statement of the current law along with a tacit
acknowledgment that the district court did not have the authority to overrule Murphy even
though Murphy unwisely shifts judicial authority to the federal courts. It is not “an invitation to
dismiss the case” as argued by the state. Counsel should not be required to frivolously deny or
contest the applicability of controlling precedent in the district court in order to argue on appeal
that the precedent should be overruled. See, I.R.P.C. 3.1.
2. The court did not dismiss on the basis of timeliness and the successive petition was
timely.
The court dismissed claims two through five pursuant to Murphy, not because the petition
was untimely. R 240. The state now argues this Court could affirm on the alternative ground of
untimeliness. State’s Brief, pg. 24. In support it cites to Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900,
174 P.3d 870 (2007), which requires claims to be raised within a reasonable time, once those
claims are known. “In determining what a reasonable time is for filing a successive petition, we
will simply consider it on a case-by-case basis, as has been done in capital cases.” Charboneau
v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 905, 174 P.3d 870, 875 (2007). That argument lacks merit. The
successive petition was filed on April 9, 2012, while the appeal from the first post-conviction
petition was still pending. R 4, 5. Sarah argued in her successive petition that there was
sufficient reason to file these claims under Palmer, i.e., that the deficient performance of postconviction counsel caused the delay in filing the claims. And the claims had been raised before
the original petition had been finally decided. That is within a reasonable amount of time under

11

Charboneau. Thus, if this Court overrules Murphy and reinstates the rule in Palmer, it should
also find that the successive petition was timely filed under Charboneau.
3. Murphy was wrongly decided
Sarah relies upon her arguments in her Opening Brief, p. 33-41 as to why Murphy should
be overruled, but adds the following observations. First, the state’s argument that Murphy was
not an unwise decision because the Court might have been aware of Martinez v. Ryan, — U.S.
—, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), is a non sequitur. The fact that the Court might have been aware it
was making an unwise decision does not mean the decision was wise, or even not unwise. That
being said, Sarah believes the effect of Martinez was most likely not anticipated by this Court as
Martinez is never cited or discussed in Murphy. Second, the fact that there is no legal cause of
action for the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel does not mean that the deficient
performance of post-conviction counsel is not “sufficient reason” to permit the filing of a
successive petition. “Sufficient reason” under I.C. § 19-4908 does not need to rise to the level of
a constitutional violation. See, Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 737, 228 P.3d 998, 1004 (2010)
(complete absence of meaningful representation during post-conviction proceedings may
constitute unique and compelling circumstances justifying relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6)).
Finally, the fact that the federal court may “decide such claims correctly” is no answer to
the question of why this Court would want to relinquish its authority to decide its own cases
correctly. A set of adoptive parents might make the correct decisions in raising a child, but that
is no reason for the biological parents to put their baby up for adoption. Finally, the possibility
exists that the federal court’s view of the correct decision will be different than this Court’s view.
That reason alone justifies the state courts doing whatever extra work is needed to decide its own
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cases. Murphy should be overruled.
C. The District Court erred in dismissing the Miller claim
1. Introduction
The Supreme Court held in Montgomery v. Louisiana, — U.S. —, 136 S. Ct. 718, 729,
(2016), as revised (Jan. 27, 2016), “that when a new substantive rule of constitutional law
controls the outcome of a case, the Constitution requires state collateral review courts to give
retroactive effect to that rule.” It continued, “[t]hat constitutional command is, like all federal
law, binding on state courts.” Id. The Montgomery Court also stated that “[a] penalty imposed
pursuant to an unconstitutional law is no less void because the prisoner’s sentence became final
before the law was held unconstitutional. There is no grandfather clause that permits States to
enforce punishments the Constitution forbids. To conclude otherwise would undercut the
Constitution’s substantive guarantees” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct., at 731. This Court
should apply Montgomery to this case and reverse the fixed life sentences.
2. The Miller/Montgomery claim could not have been raised on direct appeal
The state argues that Sarah may not attack her sentence on collateral review because she
could have raised a generic Eighth Amendment Claim in her direct appeal. State’s Brief, p. 43.
This argument is without merit because Eighth Amendment precedent in existence at the time of
the direct appeal would not have supported a claim that the JLWOP sentence here constituted
cruel and unusual punishment.
Sarah was sentenced on June 30, 2005. DNA R p. 5. Three months prior, the Supreme
Court had concluded the Eighth Amendment prohibited imposing the death penalty on juveniles.
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Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (March 1, 2005). It would take another five years before
the Court would prohibit sentencing juveniles to a life sentence without the possibility of parole
in non-homicide cases. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010), as modified (July 6, 2010).
Even then, there was a “clear line of demarcation” in Eighth Amendment analysis of juvenile
sentences between homicide and non-homicide offenses. State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 880,
n. 2, 253 P.3d 310, 317 n. 2 (2011). At the time of the direct appeal in Sarah’s case, the Eighth
Amendment was violated only when the punishment was “grossly disproportionate” to the
seriousness of the offense. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (affirming a fixed life
sentence for possession of 650 grams of cocaine). This Eighth Amendment analysis did not take
into account the individual characteristics of the defendant. A similar standard was used in State
v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992), which held that under our state constitution a
criminal sentence is cruel and unusual punishment only when it is “out of proportion to the
gravity of the offense committed, and such as to shock the conscience of reasonable [people].”
As the Court of Appeals observed: “This traditional Idaho constitutional rule focusing on the
gravity of the offense is well established and appropriate and is essentially equivalent to the
“grossly disproportionate” test used by Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Harmelin.” State v. Moore,
127 Idaho 780, 783, 906 P.2d 150, 153 (Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added). Even after Sarah’s
direct appeal was over, this Court held that a JLWOP sentence for a homicide did not
categorically violate the Eighth Amendment, nor was it unreasonable under the facts of the
homicide. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 599, 261 P.3d 853, 876 (2011); see also, State v.
Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 876, 253 P.3d 310, 313 (2011) (Rejecting the claim of a juvenile that a
determinate life sentence may not be based solely upon the egregiousness of the crime.) Even as
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late as 2012, this Court found a JLWOP sentence was not cruel and unusual under the state
constitution after applying Harmelin and Brown. State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 487, 272 P.3d
417, 459 (2012).
The JLWOP sentence here did not violate the Eighth Amendment as it was understood in
2005-2008, when the direct appeal was pending. (Graham v. Florida, supra., which prohibited
JLWOP sentences in non-homicide cases, was not decided until July, 2010.). Thus, Sarah could
not have raised such a challenge at the time of the direct appeal. More specifically, there was no
authority to support the claim that the JLWOP sentence here violated the Eighth Amendment
because Sarah is not one of those “rare juvenile offender[s] whose crime reflects irreparable
corruption” prior to June 25, 2012, when Miller v. Alabama, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2470
(2012), was decided.
It is worth noting that the state does not cite to any authority to support its argument that
the failure to raise a meritless claim on appeal bars a defendant from raising a related claim on
post-conviction after a substantive change in the law. Certainly, this Court does not want to
encourage appellants to raise meritless claims on direct appeal in the hope that the United States
Supreme Court will years later announce a substantive change in the law. “Of course, counsel’s
inability to foresee future pronouncements which will dispossess the court of power to impose a
particular sentence which is presently thought viable does not render counsel’s representation
ineffective[.]” Cooks v. United States, 461 F.2d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1972). After all,
“[c]lairvoyance is not a required attribute of effective representation.” Id. See also, State’s
Brief, p. 38. Thus, while others have raised generic Eighth Amendment claims on direct appeal
none of them have been successful or given any reason for Sarah to believe she had a meritorious
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Eighth Amendment claim. Brown, supra., cited by the state, was a fixed life case, but did not
involve a homicide, and so was, in that respect, a stronger claim than Sarah’s pre-Miller claim.
Even so, it was unsuccessful. State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho 682, 686, 991 P.2d 870, 874 (Ct. App.
1999), involved a fixed life sentence for a homicide, but the defendant was an adult. Again, the
appellant did not prevail. While two other Idaho juveniles have argued that JLWOP sentences
are cruel and unusual punishment, both cases arose after Sarah’s direct appeal was over and were
based upon Graham which was decided in 2010. Draper, supra (2011) and Adamcik, supra
(2012). Until Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court had not held that any JLWOP sentence
could violate the Eighth Amendment and Roper v. Simmons, could be read as approving of
JLWOP sentences as capital punishment was barred for juveniles. And, as previously noted, this
Court rejected Draper’s and Adamcik’s arguments. There can be no doubt that same result
would have obtained even if Sarah had made the argument prior to Graham.
The state argues that Sarah could have raised an Eighth Amendment claim even without
supporting authority stating that “[i]f [existing authority] were a requirement, Miller could never
have brought a successful claim.” State’s Brief pp. 36-37. In fact, however, Miller raised his
Eighth Amendment claim after Graham v. Florida had been decided. He argued that Graham’s
ban on JLWOP sentences in non-homicide cases should be extended to mandatory life sentences
homicide cases. Sarah’s appeal was prior to Graham. And, Kuntell Jackson, the defendant in
the companion case in Miller, did not make an Eighth Amendment challenge in his direct appeal.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct., at 2461 (“Jackson did not challenge the sentence on appeal, and
the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions.”). Jackson raised the issue for the first
time in a state petition for habeas corpus. Id. Moreover, as the state points out, counsel’s failure
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to predict future law does not constitute deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 688 (1984). State’s Brief, p. 38, citing cases. Why then should Sarah be barred from
raising a claim in post-conviction which is based upon a substantive change in Eighth
Amendment occurring in 2012 because she did not predict that at the time of her direct appeal in
2005? There is no reason. Idaho Code § 19-4901(b) does not bar the Eighth Amendment claim
here. Sarah could not have raised the claim at the time of the direct appeal because there was no
reason to believe such a claim could succeed and, in fact, based upon this Court’s rulings in
subsequent cases, it would have failed.
3. The Miller/Montgomery claim could not have been raised in the original postconviction proceeding.
Miller was decided six years after Sarah filed her original petition for post-conviction
relief (Blaine Co. CV-2006-324) on April 19, 2006. DNA R p. 5. The second amended petition
was filed January 12, 2010, prior to Graham being decided. Judgment was entered in that case
on April 8, 2011, and the case was on appeal before the Idaho Supreme Court when Miller was
issued. DNA R p. 8. As with the direct appeal, she could not have raised her Miller claim in her
first petition.
4. There is sufficient reason to raise the claim in the successive petition and the
successive petition and claim was raised within a reasonable amount of time.
a. The claim was not available to Sarah when she filed the
successive petition
Idaho Code § 19-4908 requires that “[a]ll grounds for relief available to an applicant
under this act must be raised in his original, supplemental or amended application.” (Emphasis
added.) When Sarah filed her successive post-conviction petition on April 9, 2012, there was no
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ground for relief available to her under the Eighth Amendment. While both Roper and Graham
had been decided by then, this Court had also already rejected constitutional challenges to
JLWOP sentences in Draper (2011) and Adamcik (January 2012).8 There was no reason to raise
a challenge to her JLWOP sentence based upon Graham given this Court’s very recent rejections
of those precise claims. Still, Sarah amended her successive petition with the Eighth
Amendment claim after Miller was decided. The substantive change in Eighth Amendment law
effected by Miller is a sufficient reason to raise the claim in the successive petition. Thus, even
if the claim could have been raised in the original petition (through the use of clairvoyance) it
may be raised in a successive petition because here was “sufficient reason” why the claim “was
not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original [petition].” Johnson v. State, 158 Idaho
852, 856, 353 P.3d 1086, 1090 (Ct. App. 2015), reh’g denied (Aug. 14, 2015). As noted by the
Court of Appeals, the sufficient reason exception “exists for those cases in which an issue was
unascertainable or unavailable at the time of the original post-conviction petition.” Id., quoting
Arthur v. State, 663 N.E.2d 529, 531–32 (Ind.1996). The Miller claim was both unascertainable
and unavailable to Sarah, both when she filed her first post-conviction petition and when she first
filed her successive post-conviction. Thus, she had sufficient reason to not raise that issue.
b. The Eighth Amendment claim was filed within a reasonable time after Miller
was decided.
The state also argues that the Eighth Amendment claim, which was not raised until the

8

This Court had also denied Ethan Windom’s Petition for Rehearing which argued the
Court’s holding “that, in appropriate cases, a district court may impose a determinate life
sentence based upon the egregiousness of the crime” was violative of the Eighth Amendment.
State v. Windom, supra, rehearing denied (June 21, 2011). Counsel for the Respondent here was
counsel for the Respondent in Windom.
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amended petition, was untimely. It cites again to Charboneau v. State, supra, which requires
claims to be raised within a reasonable time, once those claims are known. “In determining what
a reasonable time is for filing a successive petition, we will simply consider it on a case-by-case
basis, as has been done in capital cases.” Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho at 905, 174 P.3d at
875. Here, the Eighth Amendment claim was raised within a reasonable time. The successive
petition was filed on April 9, 2012. DNA R p. 4. At that time, the appeal in the original postconviction petition was still pending. Miller was decided on June 25, 2012. On January 22,
2014, counsel filed the Amended Petition. While this was 18 months after Miller was issued, no
action was being taken on the successive petition due to the appointment of counsel in place of
pro bono counsel and because of the pendency of the appeal. The state had not answered the
petition or filed a responsive pleading thereto. The opinion from the original post-conviction
was not issued until February 18, 2014, after the filing of the amended successive petition.
Johnson v. State, 156 Idaho 7, 319 P.3d 491 (2014).
c. Under the state’s reading of Miller, the Charboneau reasonable
time period did not begin to run until Montgomery was decided.
It is certainly arguable that the Charboneau reasonable time period did not start running
until Montgomery was decided because it was unclear whether Miller even applied to Idaho’s
discretionary sentencing scheme or, if it did, that it would also apply retroactively. Thus, it
would have been reasonable for Sarah to wait until Montgomery clarified those issues before
filing. At the time Miller was first issued, it was not clear the opinion even applied to Idaho. In
fact, even today, the state takes the position Miller only “held that a statutory scheme that
requires imposition of a mandatory fixed life sentence for juvenile murderers, without the
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possibility of parole, violates the Eighth Amendment[.]” State’s Brief, p. 44. So, according to
the state, Miller does not apply to Idaho’s discretionary sentencing scheme. Id. Thus, it follows
that Sarah could not have been put on notice that her sentence violated the Eighth Amendment
merely by the announcement of Miller ban on mandatory JLWOP sentences because her
sentences are discretionary. And, in fact, there were many cases holding Miller did not apply to
discretionary systems issued before and near the time Sarah filed her amended petition. See, e.g.,
Silva v. McDonald, 891 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1130–31 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (describing Miller holding
as being limited to mandatory JLWOP sentences); Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind.
2012) (concluding that Miller did not apply to discretionary sentencing schemes like Indiana’s);
Arredondo v. State, 406 S.W.3d 300, 306 (Tex. App. 2013) (“Miller prevented the mandatory
imposition of life without parole for juvenile offenders, but specifically allowed a discretionary
sentence of life without parole when the circumstances justify it” [emphasis omitted] ) see also,
State v. Vera, 334 P.3d 754, 761 (Ariz. App. 2014) (“We cannot agree that Arizona's sentencing
statute violated the rule in Miller by preclud[ing] a sentencer from taking account of an
offender’s age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it.... To the
contrary, at all times relevant to this decision, the sentencing statute has provided what appears to
be a lesser alternative to a sentence of natural life ....”) (internal quotations omitted); State v. Ali,
855 N.W.2d 235, 258 (Minn. 2014) (“[b]ecause the imposition of consecutive [life] sentences
was not mandatory, but was discretionary, [the defendant's] reliance on Miller is misplaced”);
Bell v. Uribe, 748 F.3d 857, 869 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. DeMola v. Johnson, 135
S. Ct. 1545 (2015) (Miller does not apply because “DeMola was not sentenced to life without the
possibility of parole pursuant to a mandatory sentencing scheme that did not afford the
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sentencing judge discretion to consider the specific circumstances of the offender and the
offense.”). So, under the state’s own logic, Sarah could not have been put on notice that her
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment until January 25, 2016, when Montgomery v.
Louisiana, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 717 (2016), which clarified the scope of Miller, was announced.
Sarah, by filing her claim on January 24, 2014, anticipated the evolution of Eighth Amendment
law announced in Montgomery by two years and a day. Thus, her claim was filed well within the
Charboneau reasonable time period.
Another reason why Montgomery is actually the trigger date for the Charboneau
reasonable time period is that it was unclear whether Miller, if it applied to discretionary
sentences like those in Idaho, would apply retroactively. Many cases decided shortly after Miller
was announced held that Miller was not retroactive. See, e.g., Com. v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1,
11 (Penn. 2013); State v. Tate, 130 So.3d 829, 838 (La. 2013); Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d
311, 331 (Minn. 2013) People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 827–28 (Mich. 2014).
Recently, after acknowledging that Montgomery had overruled prior state precedent, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court held that “[b]ecause the Montgomery decision was needed to clarify
Miller” the statute of limitations applicable to Miller claims did not begin to run until
Montgomery was decided. Com. v. Secreti, 134 A.3d 77, 82 (Pa. Super 2016). But even if the
reasonable time period was triggered by Miller, Sarah still filed within a reasonable time given:
1) the confusion whether Miller even applied in Idaho’s discretionary system; 2) whether, if
Miller did apply, it would be applied retroactively, and the facts that 3) she had a successive
petition filed prior to Miller; 4) the state had not answered that successive petition; 4) that no
action was pending taken on the successive petition due to the pendency of the appeal of her
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original petition before this Court, which 5) could have render any sentencing challenge moot.
Thus, the district court erred in finding that Sarah’s amended claim was not timely filed.
5. Miller/Montgomery applies in Idaho
As noted above, the state argues that Miller only applies to mandatory life sentences.
State’s Brief, p. 54. It then argues that since Montgomery only makes Miller retroactive and
Miller only applies to mandatory JLWOP sentences, Montgomery in turn only applies to
mandatory JLWOP sentences. State’s Brief, p. 48. The state’s argument, however, ignores this
passage from Montgomery:
Because Miller determined that sentencing a child to life without parole is
excessive for all but the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable
corruption, it rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for a class of
defendants because of their status—that is, juvenile offenders whose crimes
reflect the transient immaturity of youth.
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct., at 734 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Montgomery makes clear that a JLWOP sentence is an unconstitutional sentence for a certain
class of juveniles. The focus is on the characteristics of the particular juvenile, not on whether
the sentence is imposed pursuant to a mandatory statute or by the court in the exercise of
discretion. Such a sentence is unconstitutional irrespective of the mandatory/discretionary
nature. “Even if a court considers a child’s age before sentencing him or her to a lifetime in
prison, that sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects
unfortunate yet transient immaturity.” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct., at 733-34 (internal
quotations omitted).
Since Montgomery was announced, the Florida Supreme Court has held in that “the
Supreme Court's decision in Miller applies to juvenile offenders whose sentences of life
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imprisonment without parole were imposed pursuant to a discretionary sentencing scheme when
the sentencing court, in exercising that discretion, was not required to, and did not take ‘into
account how children are different and how those differences counsel against irrevocably
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.’” Landrum v. State, 192 So. 3d 459, 460 (Fla. 2016),
quoting Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2469. The Landrum Court reasoned that:
Even in a discretionary sentencing scheme, the sentencing court’s exercise of
discretion before imposing a life sentence must be informed by consideration of
the juvenile offender’s “youth and its attendant circumstances” as articulated in
Miller . . . . The sentencing court's discretion must be guided by two overarching
principles set forth in Miller and reaffirmed by Montgomery v. Louisiana, –––
U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016): The requirement that
sentencing courts give due weight to evidence that Miller deemed constitutionally
significant before determining that the most severe punishment possible for
juvenile offenders is appropriate; and that under Miller, sentencing juvenile
offenders to life imprisonment must be “rare” and “uncommon.” Miller, 132 S.Ct.
at 2469.
Landrum v. State, 192 So. 3d 459, 460 (Fla. 2016).
Several courts have found Miller to apply to discretionary sentencing schemes since
Sarah filed her amended petition. See, e.g., People v. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d 245, 269 (Cal. 2014)
(applying Miller to discretionary sentencing scheme which had presumption in favor of JLWOP).
As explained by the South Carolina Supreme Court:
We recognize that in holding the Eighth Amendment proscribes a sentencing
scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile
offenders, the [Miller] Court did not expressly extend its ruling to states such as
South Carolina whose sentencing scheme permits a life without parole sentence to
be imposed on a juvenile offender but does not mandate it. Indeed, the Court
noted that because its holding was sufficient to decide the cases before it,
consideration of the defendants’ alternative argument that the Eighth Amendment
requires a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles was unnecessary. Id.
at 2469. However, we must give effect to the proportionality rationale integral to
Miller’s holding—youth has constitutional significance. As such, it must be
afforded adequate weight in sentencing.
23

Thus, we profoundly disagree with the position advanced by the respondents and
the dissent that the import of the Miller decision has no application in South
Carolina. Miller is clear that it is the failure of a sentencing court to consider the
hallmark features of youth prior to sentencing that offends the Constitution.
Contrary to the dissent’s interpretation, Miller does more than ban mandatory life
sentencing schemes for juveniles; it establishes an affirmative requirement that
courts fully explore the impact of the defendant's juvenility on the sentence
rendered.
Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572, 576–77 (S.C. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2379 (2015)
(emphasis added). Accord, State v. Riley, 110 A.3d 1205, 1216 (Conn. 2015), cert. denied, 136
S. Ct. 1361 (2016) (“[W]e conclude that Miller does not stand solely for the proposition that the
eighth amendment demands that the sentencer have discretion to impose a lesser punishment
than life without parole on a juvenile homicide offender. Rather, Miller logically indicates that, if
a sentencing scheme permits the imposition of that punishment on a juvenile homicide offender,
the trial court must consider the offender's ‘chronological age and its hallmark features’ as
mitigating against such a severe sentence.”)
Montgomery establishes Miller does apply to discretionary sentencing schemes and
applies retroactively and thus applies to Sarah’s sentence.
6. Sarah’s sentence violates Miller/Montgomery
First, the state does not address Sarah’s contention that under the logic of Miller JLWOP
sentences are categorically unconstitutional under the Eigth Amendment. See Opening Brief, pp.
65-66. Then it only very briefly addresses Sarah’s argument that the sentencing court did not
adequately consider the Miller factors. Its two paragraph argument in response does not require a
detailed reply. Compare Opening Brief, pp. 66-71 and Supplemental Brief, pp. 6-8 to
Respondent’s Brief, pp. 48-49. Suffice it to say that the sentencing court did not make a finding,
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implicit or otherwise, that the crimes did not reflect Sarah’s transient immaturity and that Sarah
is irreparably corrupt; nor was there sufficient evidence in the record to sustain such a finding
had it even been considered and made. To the contrary, the sentencing ignored mitigation
evidence regarding Sarah’s youth and actually used her youth as aggravating evidence both in
violation of Miller and Montgomery. The JLWOP sentences violate the Eighth Amendment.
They should be reversed and a new sentencing hearing ordered.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, this Court should reverse the order denying Sarah’s request to
have evidence DNA tested. It should also reverse or vacate the JLWOP sentences and remand
for resentencing in light of Miller. Finally, it should overrule Murphy v. State and remand claims
2-5 for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of August, 2016.
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